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THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
1998 CASE COMPILATION
Smith Barney Shearson Inc. v. Sacharowl
(decided December 4, 1997)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that
the six-year eligibility provision of the National Association of Securities
Dealers Code creates the substantive feature that may affect the right to
arbitrate.2 In addition, the court held that the arbitrability of a dispute is
itself a proper subject for arbitration, and that New York's choice of law
provisions in customer agreements do not trump core arbitration provisions.3
II.

BACKGROUND

Two issue-related proceedings-based on Section 15 of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Code of Arbitration-were
merged by the Court of Appeals for this decision. 4 In the first case, the
Sacharow brothers, as executors of their father's estate, filed a statement
of claim with the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) in
1994, seeking arbitration concerning investments made by Edward
Greenhill, a Smith Barney broker. The plaintiffs contended that their father's medical condition, prior to his death, prevented him from monitoring his investments and that Greenhill consummated "risky and speculative investments, resulting in a substantial depletion of their father's investment account." 5 The customer agreement between the deceased and
Smith Barney contained the following clauses: "(1) [a]ny controversy...

1. 689 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 1997).

2.
3.
4.
5.

See id. at 884.
See id.
See NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 15 (1984).
Sacharow,689 N.E.2d at 885.
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shall be settled by arbitration' in accordance with the rules of the NASD
Code; and (2) the agreement 'shall be governed by the laws of the State
of New York without giving effect to [its] choice of law or conflict of
laws provisions. 6 Both Greenhill and Smith Barney moved to block the
arbitration arguing that the transactions in question were "executed six
years prior to the filing of the statement of claim." 7 In addition, Greenhill
and Smith Barney claimed that "eligibility for arbitration is an arbitrability question, whose determination is reserved solely to the courts." 8
The stay initially was granted by the Supreme Court, New York
County, but the plaintiffs' claims were later reconsidered by the court. 9
Upon reconsideration, the Supreme Court denied Smith Barney's application and ordered the parties to proceed with the arbitration.10 The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed noting that Section 15 of the
NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure contains claim limitations on the
power of the arbitrator to entertain such claims, and that Section 15 is an
eligibility requirement, and not a statute of limitations.1" Regardless of
whether the arbitration agreement contains a New York choice of law
provision, an issue raised pursuant to Section 15 should be determined by12
the courts, "since eligibility is a question of substantive arbitrability.
The appellate court then concluded that the agreement in question
"clearly and unambiguously indicate[d] that the parties agreed to arbi13
trate all disputes, including eligibility."
In the second action, Vivian Hause, an elderly woman, invested in a
highly speculative limited partnership based on Smith Barney's advice
given to her in 1986 and 1987. After suffering substantial losses, Hause

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. See Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Sacharow, 656 N.Y.S.2d 203, 204 (1st
Dep't 1997).
10. See Sacharow, 689 N.E.2d at 885.
11.
12.

See Sacharow, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
Id.

13. Id.at205.
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filed a claim and an arbitration demand with the NASD. 14 The customer
agreement between Hause and Smith Barney contained the same provisions as those found in the Sacharow agreement. 15 The Supreme Court,
New York County, granted Smith Barney's motion to block the arbitration. 16 The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, noting that
while the eligibility provision found in Section 15 of the NASD Code
constituted a question of arbitrability that should be decided by a court,
here, the "clear and unmistakable evidence [is] that the parties intended
that [arbitrability] would be decided by the arbitrator."' 17 In addition, the
Appellate Division held that the agreement overrode any "implication
that could be drawn from a simple New York choice of law clause that
the parties intended that the courts would decide Section 15 eligibility."' 8
Based on this reasoning, the appellate court ruled that the issue should be
kept out of the courts.
IH.

DIscussIoN

As mentioned above, the two proceedings are based on Section 15 of
NASD
Code of Arbitration. The court noted that the applicable prothe
visions of Section 15 of the NASD Code of Arbitration raise two questions: "arbitrability of the ineligibility time bar" and "the appropriate forum for the determination of that threshold issue[.]"'19
The court began its discussion by addressing "whether the eligibility
feature of Section 15 of the NASD Code [was] a condition precedent to
arbitration, and, thus whether it constitute[d] a question of arbitrability.",20 The court held that Section 15 of the NASD Code, which provides
that "[n]o dispute, claim, or controversy shall be eligible for submission

14. See Sacharow, 689 N.E.2d at 886.

15. See id.
16.

See id.

17. Smith Barney, Inc. v. Hause, 655 N.Y.S.2d 489,491 (1st Dep't 1997).
18. Id. at492.
19. Sacharow, 689 N.E.2d at 885.
20. Id. at 886.
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to arbitration under this Code where six (6) years shall have elapsed from
the occurrence or event giving rise to the act or dispute, claim or controversy[J" 21 is not a "'mere' proceduralism" or statute of limitations, but
rather a "substantive eligibility requirement. 22 The section "creates 23
a
substantive feature that may affect the right and obligation to arbitrate"
as it "limits
the subject of, entitlement to and range of arbitrable mat24
ters."
The court acknowledged the principle that the "question of arbitrability is an issue generally for judicial determination[.] ' 25 However, it also
noted that there is an exception to this rule; 26 this exception exists when
the parties to the agreement "clearly and unmistakabl[y]" committed to
arbitrating the issue of arbitrability. 27 The court then had to determine
whether the parties in the present proceedings had "clearly and unmistakabl[y]" committed to arbitrate arbitrability as part of their alternative
dispute resolution."
In analyzing this issue, the court relied heavily on the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in PaineWebber
Inc. v. Bybyk. 29 In that case, the court considered a provision in an arbitration agreement that provided that "any and all controversies ... shall
be determined by arbitration" and held that such a clause clearly
"evince[d] the parties' intent to submit issues of arbitrability to the arbitrators.,30 The court in PaineWebberfurther held that the "any and all"
language encompassed disputes involving the scope and timeliness of

21. NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 15.
22. Sacharow,689 N.E.2d at 887.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 886.
25. Id. at 887.
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. (relying on the exception noted in PaineWebberInc. v. BybyA 81 F.3d
1193, 1199 (2d Cir. 1996)).
30. PaineWebberInc., 81 F.3dat 1199.
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claims. 3 1 Like the Second Circuit, the New York Court of Appeals in
Sacharow also emphasized that the drafters of the arbitration agreements
protect their
were primarily investment houses who could "adequately
32
interests with specificity of inclusion and exclusion.,
Next, the court in Sacharow looked at the language of Section 35 of
the NASD Code, which provides that "[t]he arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions under
[the NASD] Code and to take appropriate action to obtain compliance
with any ruling by the arbitrator(s). 3 3 The court concluded that this proand timelivision "commits all issues,
34 including issues of arbitrability
ness, to the arbitrators[.]
The court then addressed the potential clash between an arbitration
clause and a New York choice of law clause. 35 The court held that the
"parties' contractual choice of New York law should not trump the core
arbitration provision." 36 In making this determination, and distinguishing
37
prior rulings that were based both on statutory and contractual issues,
the court emphasized that the issues in the instant case concerned only a
contractual time limitation under the NASD.38 The court relied on the
U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton.3 9 In that case, a customer agreement included a New York choice

31. See id.
32. Sacharow,689 N.E.2d at 887-88.
33. NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 35 (1992).
34. Sacharow, 689 N.E.2d at 888 (citing FSC SEC Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310,
1312-13 (8th Cir. 1994) and PaineWebber Inc., 81 F.3d at 1202).

35. See id.
36. Id.
37. The court explained that while the decision in Smith Barney, Harris Upham &
Co. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193 (1995), correctly held that New York statutory law requires
that time limitations questions are for the courts, it is distinguishable as the issues in this
appeal relate to contractuallimitations questions agreed upon by the parties. See Sacharow,689 N.E.2d at 889.
38. See Sacharow,689 N.E.2d at 888-89.
39. 514 U.S. 52 (1995); see Sacharow,689 N.E.2d at 889 (addressing the need to
rely upon Mastrobuono).
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of law provision and an arbitration clause that required that "any controversy" must be arbitrated according to the NASD's rules.40 The arbitrator
awarded punitive damages to the investor, and the brokerage house challenged the award on the ground that New York law prohibited arbitrators
from awarding punitive damages. 4 1 Despite the New York law precluding the power of awarding punitive damages, the Supreme Court held
that the arbitrator's decision was proper.42 In reaching its decision, the
Supreme Court held that "the choice-of-law provision covers the rights
clause covers arbitration;
and duties of the parties, while the arbitration
3
neither sentence intrudes upon the other.A
Based on this reasoning, the Sacharow court concluded that "[a] boilerplate choice of law clause [did] not necessarily signify the parties' acceptance of limitations imposed by New York law with respect to the
contractually conferred power on an arbitrator to determine all issues,
including arbitrability. ' "4 The court also held that the "choice of law provision ...[did] not diminish the parties' intention to arbitrate 'any and
all controversies." 45 The court further stated that "a choice of law clause
incorporates substantive New York principles" without restricting "the
scope of authority of the arbitrators." '
In conclusion, the court noted that "[t]his decision fortifies and advances the long and strong public policy favoring arbitration" which
New York "favors and encourages as a means of conserving the time and
resources of the courts and the contracting parties. 47 In addition, the
court added that "[p]arties should be free to opt for [arbitration], '48 and
that "it would be ironic and anomalous to permit parties from the securi-

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Mastrobuono,514 U.S. at 58-59.
See id. at 55.
See id.
Id. at 64.
Sacharow,689 N.E.2d at 888.
Id. at 889.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 890.
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ties industry, who generally derive benefits from the arbitration method
they impose on their thousands of consumers, to elude the comprehen' 9
sive language of their own industry-drafted arbitration agreements. A
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Sacharow, the New York Court of Appeals held that the six-year
eligibility provision of the National Association of Securities Dealers
Code creates the substantive feature that, in certain instances, affects the
right to arbitrate. In addition, the court held that New York choice of law
provisions in customer agreements do not trump core arbitration provisions, nor do they diminish the intention of the parties to arbitrate "any
and all controversies," including the question of arbitrability itself.

49.

Id.

New York Botanical Garden v. Board of Standardsand
Appeals of New York1
(decided April 2, 1998)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that
the Board of Standards and Appeals ("BSA") of the City of New York
was entitled to deference in making decisions, and that its decisions will
be upheld so long as they are reasonable, rational, and consistent with the
governing statute.2
11.

BACKGROUND

Since 1947, Fordham University has operated a broadcasting station
as part of its educational program at its Rose Hill campus.3 In 1993,
Fordham applied to the New York City Department of Buildings
("DOB") for a permit to build a new broadcasting facility and attendant
tower as an "accessory use" on its Rose Hill Campus.4 The permit was
issued by the DOB, and Fordham began construction. The petitioner, the
New York Botanical Garden, a neighboring landowner located near the
eastern end of the campus, objected to the issuance of the permit, and the
DOB commissioner issued an order to stop work until the issue could be
resolved. 6 The commissioner later reissued the permit, informing Fordham that the DOB had determined that the radio station and tower did
constitute an "accessory use" as that term is defined in Zoning Resolution section 12-10. 7 An administrative appeal and two public hearings
followed, and the BSA affirmed the commissioner's determination and

1. 694 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1998).
2. See id.at 426.

3. See id.at 425.
4. Id. The broadcasting facility and tower were described as accessory uses to the
principal use of the property, which was as an educational institution. See id.

5. See id.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 425-26.
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rejected the petitioner's contention that the tower could be smaller or
relocated to another site.8 The BSA expressly ruled on the issue of
whether the radio station and proposed tower are "incidental to" and
with a university's primary use; the
"customarily found" in connection
9
BSA concluded that they were.
The Botanical Garden then filed a petition under Article 78 of the
CPLR, to repeal the BSA's ruling that the radio station and the tower
constituted an accessory use of Fordham's property. 10 The supreme court
dismissed the Botanical Garden's petition, holding that the BSA's deterrination was both rational and supported by substantial evidence." The
court rejected the petitioner's claim that the BSA's determination was
arbitrary and capricious, stating that the petitioner was improperly relying on an aesthetic argument.' 2 The court also found it significant that the
construction of a new tower was a practical necessity in order for the station to comply with FCC regulations. 13 Additionally, the court noted that
it would be abusing its judicial power to annul the BSA's determination
because the BSA, comprised of expert members trained to consider all
relevant factors with regard to zoning, real estate, and safety issues at the
local level, determined that Fordham's application for a proposed tower
constituted an accessory use. 14 Finally, the supreme court considered the
timing of the Botanical Garden's petition, and questioned why it was not
filed until16 the tower was half-constructed.' 5 The petitioner appealed the
decision.

8. See id. at 426.

9. Id.
10. See id.
11. See New York Botanical Garden v. Board of Standards and Appeals of New
York, N.Y.L.J., June 19, 1996, at 25 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).

12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See New York Botanical Garden v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 656
N.Y.S.2d 242 (1st Dep't 1997).
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The Supreme Court, Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the
decision, holding that the BSA's decision was supported by substantial
evidence that it is not uncommon for colleges and universities to own
and operate radio stations and that the BSA's decision was rationally
based on a statute that specifically lists radio towers as an accessory
use. 17 The petitioner again appealed, and the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the appellate division's decision, noting that the BSA is comprised of many experts familiar with land use, planning and its interpretation of the Zoning Resolution.18 As such, the BSA is entitled to deference
unreaso long as its interpretation of a resolution is neither "irrational,
19
sonable nor inconsistent with the governing statute ... ,
IH.

DiscussIoN

The court began its analysis by reviewing Zoning Resolution section
12-10, and determined that there is a three-pronged test for determining
whether a use qualifies as an accessory use.20 First, the accessory use
must be conducted on the same zoning lot as the principal use.2 1 Second,
it must be "clearly incidental to, and customarily found in connection
with[,]" the principal use.22 Third, there must be "unity of ownership,
23
either legal or beneficial, between the principal and accessory uses."
The Botanical Garden took issue with the second prong of the three-part
test and the BSA's determination that the tower was both incidental to,
and customarily found in connection with, the principal use of the land as
a university campus.24 The Botanical Garden further argued that the
"customarily found" inquiry presents an issue for legal, and not factual,
17. Seeid. at242.
18. See New York Botanical Garden v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 694
N.E.2d at 426.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 427.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
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interpretation. 25 Thus, the petitioner argued, the court should determine
the "customarily found" question-it should not be left to the BSA.2 6
The court rejected the Botanical Garden's argument, and determined
that whether the proposed tower and station uses are "clearly incidental
to and customarily found in connection with" the principal use is a question of fact for the BSA to decide.2 7 The court further noted that pursuant
to section 659(b) of the New York City Charter, the BSA includes a city
planner, an engineer, and an architect, and "[t]hese professionals unanimously determined that the radio station and the proposed tower are incidental8 to, and customarily found in connection with, [Fordham Univer2

sity]."

The court then addressed the Botanical Garden's argument that the
"customarily found" element of the definition of accessory use is a legal
question. 29 The Botanical Garden relied on the court of appeal's decision
in Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass "nv. City of New York.3 ° In that case, the
court determined that whether a restaurant was of "special historical or
aesthetic interest" under the Administrative Code of the City of New
York was a question of fact better left to the expertise of the Landmarks
Preservation Commission. 31 The question of whether the restaurant
would only be given landmark status if it was "customarily open or achowever, was a legal determination that would be
cessible to the public,"
32
made by the court.
The court distinguished the New York Botanical Garden case from
the Teachers case, stating that there is no dispute that radio stations and
their attendant towers are incidental to the principal uses of college and
university campuses in New York and in other states around the coun25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
623 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1993).
Id. at 528.
Id. at 528-29.
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The court explained that the factual issue before the BSA was
whether "a station of this particular size and power, with a 480-foot
tower, [is] customarily found on a college campus or is there something
inherently different in [Fordham's] radio station and tower that would
justify treating it differently., 34 The court also noted that Botanical Garden initially objected to the size of Fordham's radio operations, arguing
that it was highly unusual for a university to operate a station that is affiliated with National Public Radio and that broadcasts at a signal
strength of 50,000 watts.35
To rebut these assertions, Fordham produced evidence that over 180
college or university radio stations are affiliated with National Public
Radio, and over half of these operated at a signal strength of 50,000
watts.3 6 Fordham also introduced evidence that building this tower was a
necessity in order to comply with current FCC regulations and licensing
requirements.3 7 Based on the above evidence, the court found that the
Botanical Garden's argument ignored the fact that the Zoning Resolution
classification of accessory uses is based upon functional, rather than
structural, specifics. 38 According to the court, there was more than adequate evidence for the BSA to conclude that the proposed radio station
and tower use is customarily found in connection with a college or university.3 9
The court also addressed the concern that if it enacted a new restriction on accessory uses that was not found in the Zoning Resolution, it
would be encroaching on the BSA's determination of the appropriate size
and scope of towers based upon an individual assessment of need.40 This
determination must be made by the BSA, and courts may intervene only

33. See New York BotanicalGarden, 694 N.E.2d at 427.
34. Id.
35. See id. at428.
36. See id.
37. See id.

38. See id.
39.
40.

See id.
See id. at 428-29.
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if the BSA's determination is arbitrary or capricious.4 1
Finally, the court addressed the Botanical Garden's argument that the
BSA ignored its obligation to consider the environmental impact of the
tower on an adjoining property before designating it as an accessory
use. 42 More specifically, the Botanical Garden stressed the negative impact of such a tower on the unique nature of the Botanical Garden's
buildings and grounds. 3 Although the court did not dismiss these legitimate concerns, it concluded that the environmental issues are not the legal issues presented in this case; instead, the court was asked to determine only whether the BSA's decision in permitting
the accessory use on
44
Fordham's property was arbitrary or capricious.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals held that the BSA's ruling was entitled to deference, and that a 480-foot radio antenna tower built on the
Fordham University campus was a permitted "accessory use" under the
New York City Zoning Resolution.4 5 The court found that substantial
evidence supported the BSA's ruling, which the court found neither arbitrary nor capricious.4 6

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Seeid.at429.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 427-28.
See id.at428.

DiamondAsphalt, Corp. v. Sander'
(decided July 9, 1998)
I.

SYNOPSIS

Recently, the New York Court of Appeals declared that New York
City's current bid selection procedure violated General Municipal Law §
103(1),2 which provides that contracts for "public work" must be
awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder" unless otherwise provided by
an act of legislature or a local law adopted prior to September 1, 1953. 3
Under the stricken procedure, a contract was awarded to the bidder
whose combined bid for both the utility interference work and the street
construction work portions of a project was the lowest bid, regardless of
whether the bid for the street construction portion of the contract on its
own was the lowest bid of its kind.4
I. BACKGROUND

In 1992, New York City entered into a joint bidding agreement with
Con Edison, New York Telephone and Empire City Subway,5 which
covered City construction projects "mutually agreed upon" between the
City and the utility companies.6 Under the agreement, the City would
"solicit bid specifications for all aspects of the work involved in a public
project, including utility interference work"7 - that work necessary to
protect utility facilities during street repair projects. 8 The City agreed to
award contracts to the bidder whose aggregate bid for both the utility
interference work and the City's reconstruction work was the lowest re-

1. 700 N.E.2d 1203 (N.Y. 1998).
2. See id. at 1215; see also N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 103 (McKinney 1996).
3. DiamondAsphalt,700 N.E.2d at 1208.
4. See id. at 1205 (describing the nature of the joint bidding agreement between
the City of New York and Con Edison, New York Telephone and Empire City Subway).
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Id.

8. See id. at 1204.
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ceived. 9 However, under the agreement, the lowest combined bidder was
often not the lowest bidder for the City's share of the work.'
In the transaction at issue in the present case, Diamond Asphalt Corporation submitted the lowest bid for the City's portion of the work, but
its aggregate bid, which included the utility work, was not the lowest bid
received by the City." After the City awarded the contracts at issue to
the lowest aggregate bidder, the City Chief Procurement Officer issued a
letter to Diamond advising the company that the City had invoked its
"bypass authority" under New York City Charter § 313(b)(2). 12 Bypass
authority allows the Mayor, who delegated this authority to the City
Chief Procurement Officer, to award a contract to a bidder other than the
bidder when it is determined to be in the "best interest
lowest responsible
13
of the City.',
Diamond initiated legal proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78,
challenging the City's selection methods, and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent certification of the contracts.' 4 The City, along with
utility companies, moved to dismiss the
several intervenor-respondent
5
petition.1
The Supreme Court denied the preliminary injunction and granted
the respondent's motion to dismiss holding that utility interference work
was not "public work" under General Municipal Law § 103(1).16 In determining the lowest responsible bidder, the court found that the City
could not consider the amount bid for the utility interference work. 17 The
court also determined that the Mayor's "bypass" authority under Charter

9. See id. at 1205.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Id. at 1206; see also N.Y. CrrYCHARTER ch. 13 § 313(b)(2) (1989).
13. N.Y. Crr, CHARTER ch. 13 § 313(b)(2)(1989); see also DiamondAsphalt, 700
N.E.2d at 1207.
14. See DiamondAsphalt,700 N.E.2d at 1206.
15. See DiamondAsphalt, 700 N.E.2d at 1206-07.
16. Id. at 1207; see also N.Y. GEN'.MUN. LAW § 103(1).
17. See DiamondAsphalt, 700 N.E.2d at 1207.
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§ 313(b)(2) allows the City
18 to award contracts to bidders other than the
lowest responsible bidder.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision stating that19
the Mayor lawfully invoked his Charter § 313(b)(2) bypass authority.
The court found that the Mayor's exercise of the bypass authority did not
violate General Municipal Law § 103(1) because such "authority was
established prior to September 1, 1953 and was merely revised and restated upon its transfer to the Mayor when the Board of Estimate was
abolished." 20 Further, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court and
held that the utility interference work did constitute public work under
General Municipal Law § 103(1).21
III. DIscussioN
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by resolving two "threshold
matters. 2 2 First, the court acknowledged that the injunctive proceeding
was moot since "the work under the contracts at issue [was] completely
or substantially done. .. The court therefore converted the matter into
a declaratory judgment action because the issues presented constituted a
clear legal
challenge to the validity of the bidding regimen being used by
24
the City.
Second, the court addressed Diamond's contention that the Appellate
Division should not have considered whether utility interference work is
public work and therefore properly included in determining the lowest

18. Id.; see also N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 13 § 313(b)(2)(1989).
19. See Diamond Asphalt Corp. v. Sander, 656 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (1st Dep't
1997); see also DiamondAsphalt,700 N.E.2d at 1207.
20. Diamond Asphalt, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 249; see also Diamond Asphalt, 700
N.E.2d at 1207 (quoting the Appellate Division decision).
21. See Diamond Asphalt, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 249; see also DiamondAsphalt,

N.E.2d at 1207.
22. DiamondAsphalt, 700 N.E.2d at 1207.
23.

Id.

24. See id.

700
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responsible bidder.2 5 Diamond asserted that the City raised this argument
for the first time on appeal "in response to the trial court's analysis. 26
The court determined that the argument was preserved under what it
lower
termed "unusual circumstances" since it was ruled on by both
27
courts and the parties were "aware of its potential significance."
Next, the court considered whether private utility interference work
constitutes "public work" under General Municipal Law § 103(1), when,
as under the joint agreement, municipalities determine the "lowest responsible bidder" through a combined assessment of bids for utility interference work and street construction work.28
Since neither General Municipal Law § 103(1) nor its legislative history define the term "public work,929 the court instead looked to prior
cases where
courts evaluated whether a contract constituted "public
30
work."
Under the case law, the court found that in determining whether a
particular contract involves public work it is necessary to look at the "total character of the arrangement. ' 31 In applying this test, "the [c]ourt has
stressed the importance of ensuring that the underlying purposes of the
competitive bidding statutes are not violated --i.e., that there is no potential for fraud and that the Legislature's objectives are complied with. 3 z
The court considered the rationale used in the contracts cases and
concluded that the utility work at issue did not constitute public work
under General Municipal Law § 103. 33 Although the Court felt that the

25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1208.
28. Id. at 1204.
29. Id. at 1208.
30. Id.
31. Citiwide News v. New York City Transit Auth., 467 N.E.2d 241 (N.Y. 1984);
see also DiamondAsphalt, 700 N.E.2d at 1209.
32. DiamondAsphalt, 700 N.E.2d at 1213.
33. See id. at 1210.
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"core" of the transactions involved public work,34 the Court did not believe that the joint bidding agreement and side addendum 35 transformed
the private utility interference work into public work. The court noted
that side agreements (also called "commitment letters" or "side-bar let-

ters") were not part of the formal joint bidding agreement and that the
utility companies were given the "opportunity to review the accepted bid
and the differential in the constituent parts of the bid before signing onto
the side-bar letter." 36 Therefore, the court believed that the agreement in
to the public bidding process 37 and
the instant case was contradictory
"open[ed] the door to fraud. ' 38
The court next addressed whether New York City Charter §

313(b)(2), as adopted in 1989, is valid under General Municipal Law §
103(1). 39 The court addressed the argument that bypass power was contained in the previous charter, and thus Charter § 313(b) is a "mere revi-

sion, simplification, consolidation, codification or restatement of a preSeptember 1, 1953 special law or local law" which should be considered
a local law adopted prior to September 1, 1953.40
First, the court noted that the Legislature did not classify Charter §

313 as a "mere revision, simplification, consolidation, codification or
restatement" of the previous Charter.41 The court did not believe that

34. Id.
35. See id. Under the joint bidding agreement at issue, the City would pay the accepted contractor for the entire project including the utility interference work. The utility
companies would then be obligated to reimburse the City for their portion of the work.
Under the "side addendums" at issue, the utility companies, after the contract was
awarded, would agree that the cost for their portion of the work would be adjusted to
include the difference between the accepted contractor's bid for the City's portion of the
work and the lowest bid received for the City's portion of the work. See Diamond Asphalt,700 N.E.2d at 1205-06.
36. Id. at 1212.
37. See id. at 1214.
38. Id. at 1212 (citing Matter of Signacon Controls v. Mulroy, 298 N.E.2d 670
(N.Y. 1973)).
39. See id. at 1214.
40. Id. at 1214-15 (quoting 1981 Opns. St. Comp. No. 81-109, at 111).
41. Id. at 1215 (quoting 1981 Opns. St. Comp. No. 81-109, at 111).
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Charter § 313 should be classified as such since the bypass power, which
was held originally by the now-defunct Board of Estimate, was transferred in the 1989 amendment to the Mayor.42 The court stated that to
effectuate such a power reallocation and override the plain language of
the General Municipal Law, the legislature would need to clearly declare
its intention to continue and transfer the bypass authority to the Mayor.
Further, the court stated that even if Charter § 313 could be classified
as a mere revision or recodification of the old charter provision, neither
the Legislature or the Court of Appeals has determined "that such enactments fit within the General Municipal Law exception." 44 Again, the
Court believed that clearer guidance from the legislature would be necessary to make such a determination. 45
IV. DISSENT
Chief Judge Kaye filed a dissenting opinion in which Judge Wesley
concurred, concluding that the "total character" of the joint bidding "arrangement" was of a "public work" nature since the overriding goal was
to reconstruct the City streets.46 Judge Kaye characterized the utility interference work, which accounted for less than ten percent of the total
cost of the street construction projects, as "incidental. ' 47 Finding this determination
dispositive, the Chief Judge did not reach the bypass author48
ity issue.
V.

CONCLUSION

Municipalities may no longer include the amount bid for private util-

42.
43.
44.
45.

See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.

46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1218. (Kaye, C.., dissenting).
Id. (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 1215 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
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ity interference work in determining the lowest responsible bidder for
street reconstruction contracts. Further, the Mayor may no longer invoke
bypass authority under Charter § 313 (b)(2) to award contracts to bidders
other than the lowest responsible bidder in order to effectuate agreements
similar to New York City's joint bidding agreement.

People v. Hidalgo'
(decided June 4, 1998)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the New York Court of Appeals resolved a
conflict among the departments of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division by holding that a defendant's plea waiver agreement of her right to
appeal included the right to challenge her sentence as harsh and excessive.2
II.

BACKGROUND

On February 24, 1996, Ms. Sarita Hidalgo, defendant, was involved
in a street fight where one of her associates assaulted a woman by slashing her in the face.3 The Erie County Grand Jury indicted Ms. Hidalgo of
assault in the first degree 4 on June 27, 1996. 5 Ms. Hidalgo pleaded guilty
to attempted assault in the first degree6 in accordance with a negotiated
plea agreement on October 2, 1996.! Judge Michael L. D'Amico of the
Erie County Court reviewed the agreement and informed Ms. Hidalgo
that the court could sentence her to prison for up to seven years, probation for up to five years, and/or impose a fine of up to $5,000.8 Ms. Hidalgo "confirmed that she understood the court's options, and that no
'promises or commitments' had been made concerning her sentence." 9
She then waived her right to appeal with no limitations, stating that she
understood that she could not return to any court to set aside the negoti-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

698 N.E.2d 46 (N.Y. 1998).
See id.at 46.
See id.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.10 (McKinney 1996).
See Hidalgo, 698 N.E.2d at 46.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.05 (McKinney 1996).
See Hidalgo, 698 N.E.2d at 46.
See id.at 48.
Id.
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ated plea agreement.' On November 22, 1996, Judge D'Amico sentenced Ms. Hidalgo to one to three years imprisonment."
Ms. Hidalgo appealed to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
12
Fourth Department, arguing that her sentence was harsh and excessive.
The appellate division unanimously affirmed her conviction without4
opinion. 13 The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.'
The court of appeals affirmed the lower courts, holding that Ms. Hidalgo's waiver of appeal encompassed the right to appeal her sentence,
even though she did not know her sentence at the time of the waiver. 1

I1. DISCUSSION
Ms. Hidalgo argued that her waiver of appellate review did not include the right to appeal her sentence because she did not expressly
waive that right and she did not know her sentence at the time of her
waiver.16 Judge Wesley, writing for the court, found this argument
by examining the process and effect of a
flawed and began the analysis
17
bargain.
plea
York
New
In People v. Seaberg,18 the New York Court of Appeals stated that
plea bargains are a "necessary part of the criminal justice system."' 19 A
plea bargain helps "conserve prosecutorial and judicial resources, provide prompt resolution of criminal proceedings, and permit swift and
certain punishment of law violators., 20 When a defendant enters a plea

10. See id.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See id.at47.
See People v. Hildalgo, 664 N.Y.S.2d 903 (4th Dep't 1997).
See id.
See People v. idalgo, 698 N.E.2d at 47.

15. See id. at 48.
16. See id. at 47.
17. Seeid.
18. 541 N.E.2d 1022 (N.Y. 1989).
19. Hidalgo, 698 N.E.2d at 47 (citing Seaberg,541 N.E.2d at 1024).
20. Id. (citing Seaberg,541 N.E.2d at 1024).
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the defendant waives the right to appeal the
pursuant to a plea bargain,
21
conviction and sentence.
When a plea is entered, the trial court must determine whether the
plea is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently by assessing "a
number of relevant factors, including the nature and terms of the agreement, the reasonableness of the bargain, and the age and experience of
the accused." 22 "The role of the appellate courts is to review the [trial
court's] record to ensure that the defendant's waiver reflects a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary choice. ' 23 As long as the plea waiver is "on the
record and is voluntary, knowing and intelligent," 24 the waiver is enforceable and includes "all appealable issues of the case, including those
relating to the sentence ....2'
The four departments of the appellate division have disagreed, however, on the scope of the waiver as it relates to a defendant who did not
receive a specific sentence promise as part of the plea agreement. 26 In
People v. Chandler,27 the fourth department held that even when a defendant enters into a plea agreement without a specific sentence promise,
the appeal waiver includes all issues related to the sentence. 28 InPeople
v. Leach2 9 and People v. Maye,30 on the other hand, the second and third
departments, respectively, held that the waiver does not include the right
defendant is unaware of the sentence at the
to review a sentence "if [the]
31
time of the appeal waiver."

21. See id.(citingSeaberg,541 N.E.2d at 1025).
22. Id. at 47-48 (citing Seaberg, 541 N.E.2d at 1026; People v. Callahan, 604
N.E.2d 108, 112 (N.Y. 1992)).
23. ld. at 48.
24. Id. at 47.

25. Id.
26. See id. at 47.
27. 626 N.Y.S.2d 893 (4th Dep't 1995).
28. See id. at 894.
29. 611 N.Y.S.2d 17 (2d Dep't 1994).
30. 532 N.Y.S.2d 609 (3d Dep't 1988).
31. Hidalgo,698 N.E.2d at 47.
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Ms. Hidalgo argued that her waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent because she did not know her sentence at the time of the plea and
she did not expressly waive her right to appeal the sentence.32 After review of the trial court record, the court of appeals found that Ms. Hidalgo
was advised of the sentencing options. She stated that she understood the
court's options, and she "expressly waived her right to appeal without
limitation." 33 The court of appeals concluded that Ms. Hidalgo "knowingly and intelligently waived her right to appeal from any and all aspects of her case, including the sentence. 3 4 The court conceded that Ms.
Hidalgo did not expressly waive the right to challenge her sentence;
however, it also noted that trial courts are not required to "engage in any
particular litany during an allocution in order to obtain a valid guilty plea
in which defendant waives a plethora of rights. 35
The court of appeals affirmed the holding in another decision delivered on the same day. People v. Lococo, 36 a consolidation of two separate
cases for the purposes of appeal, involved defendants who challenged the
severity of their sentences after entering into a plea agreement.17 The defendants claimed that since they did not know the specific sentence at the
time of the waiver, they did not waive the right to appeal the sentence in
their plea agreements. 38 The court stated that the defendants were informed of the maximum sentence the trial court could impose as a result

32. See id. at 48.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting People v. Moissett, 564 N.E.2d 653, 654 (N.Y. 1990)).
36. 699 N.E.2d 416 (N.Y. 1998).
37. See id. at 417. In Lococo, defendants Ellen and Michael Lococo were convicted in the Justice Court, Town of Cheektowaga, of endangering the welfare of a child.
See id. at 416. They each entered a plea of guilty, waived the right to appeal, and were
sentenced. See id. at 417. In Lococo's companion case, People v. Stanley, defendant Jeffrey Stanley was convicted in the same Cheektowaga court of criminal trespass, criminal
mischief, and petit larceny. See id. at 416. He also entered a plea of guilty, waived the
right to appeal, and was sentenced. See id. at 417.

38.

Seeid.at417.
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of the conviction. 39 Thus, the court, in an unanimous memorandum, cited
Hidalgo and held that "[e]ach defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived the right to appeal from' 4any and all aspects of their
case, including the severity of the sentence. A
IV. CONCLUSION
The Hidalgo court held that a defendant's plea agreement waiver of
appellate review encompasses the right to review the sentence as harsh
and excessive when the defendant is aware of the maximum sentence the
trial court may impose. 4' The question of how the defendant is made
aware of the trial court's sentencing options and the accuracy of that information arose in People v. Garcia.42 In a memorandum decision, the
court held that when a defendant allegedly receives inaccurate information from his attorney about the possible sentence under the plea agreement, this misinformation must be considered when determining whether
the plea was voluntary, knowing and intelligent.4 3 Yet, the court noted,
misinformation is not dispositive of the determination. 44 In Garcia,the
court considered the length of the defendant's sentence and determined
that the plea was voluntary, knowing and intelligent.4a
In October, the Appellate Division, Third Department, considered
the question of whether a defendant who is unaware of the sentencing
options available can challenge his sentence as harsh and excessive after
Hidalgo. In People v Shea,46 defendant James Shea pleaded guilty to
grand larceny in the second degree and was sentenced to three and a third

39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See Hidalgo, 698 N.E.2d at 48.
42. 700 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1998).

43.
44.
45.
46.

Seeid. at311.
See id.
See id.
679 N.Y.S.2d 428 (3d Dep't 1998).
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to ten years imprisonment.4 7 Mr. Shea executed a written waiver of his
right to appeal, which stated he waived this right "willingly, knowingly
and intelligently. '48 He was neither "specifically questioned" as to
whether he understood the terms, nor advised of the maximum sentence
under his plea agreement. 49 Mr. Shea appealed the sentence as harsh and
excessive.50
The Appellate Division, Third Department, distinguished Mr. Garcia's case from Hidalgo. The third department stated that in Hidalgo,
"the trial court had explained to the defendant the range of sentencing
options available, including the maximum period of incarceration, at the
time of the plea." 51 Thus, because the trial court did not advise Mr. Shea
"of the maximum sentence that he could face when he waived his right to
appeal," his waiver under the plea "did not encompass the right to challenge his sentence." 52 After reviewing Mr. Garcia's sentence, the third
department found the sentence appropriate and affirmed the trial court's
decision.53
The defendant's knowledge of the sentencing options available to the
trial court may be an important element to the holding in Hidalgo. Under
Hidalgo and Garcia, if the defendant is unaware of the sentencing options available, the appellate court will take this factor under considera-

47.

See id. at 429.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
See id at 429-30.
See id.
Id. at430.

52. Id.
53. See id.
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tion in reviewing whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

Kass v. Kass'
(decided May 7, 1998)
I. SYNOPSIS
In a matter of first impression, the New York Court of Appeals
unanimously held that agreements between gamete donors, or progenitors, concerning disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be enforced in a dispute between them.2 The court also held that the informed
consents signed by the parties manifested their mutual intention that the
pre-zygotes be donated to an in vitro fertilization ("IVF") program for
research.3
II. BACKGROUND

Appellant Maureen Kass and her husband, respondent Steve Kass,

participated in an IVF 4 program after unsuccessful efforts to conceive a
child.5 During the final IVF procedure, five pre-zygotes were cryopreserved for future use.6 The parties signed four consent forms supplied by
the hospital.7 Later, when the couple decided to dissolve their marriage,
they each signed an "uncontested divorce" agreement prepared by the
appellant. 8 This agreement included a clause stating that the five prezygotes "should be disposed of [in] the manner outlined in our consent

1. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
2. See id.at 180.
3. Seeid. at 181.
4. Generally, the IVF process starts by stimulating a woman's ovaries. This stimulation produces eggs which are removed and placed in a glass dish. The pre-zygotes are
formed when sperm cells are added to the dish, thus fertilizing the eggs. The pre-zygotes
are either transferred to the woman's uterus or cryopreserved for future use. See id. at
175.
5. Seeidatl8l.
6. See id. Cryopreservation reduces physical and medical costs because delay may
enhance chances of pregnancy and eggs need not be recovered every time implantation is
attempted. See id.
7. See id. at 176.
8. Id. at 177.
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form and that neither Maureen Kass[,] Steve Kass or anyone else will lay
claim to custody of these pre-zygotes." 9
Appellant then brought this matrimonial suit seeking sole custody of
the pre-zygotes.10 The supreme court granted custody to appellant" and
the appellate division reversed. 12 A two-justice plurality held that the
parties intended to donate their pre-zygotes for research in the event that
disposition. 3 The court
they failed to reach a mutual decision regarding 14
affirmed.
and
plurality
of appeals agreed with the
H.

DIscussIoN

The court of appeals began its analysis with a summary of the law on
the disposition of frozen embryos.' 5 The court stated that New York has
not yet adopted a statute dealing with this issue and that only one case
nationwide has set out guidelines to resolve disputes between a divorcing
couple regarding the disposition of stored embryos.' 6 In Davis v. Davis, 7
the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that when a prior written agreedoes not exist, courts must balance the parties'
ment between the parties
18
competing interests.
Because statutory and case law is minimal, the New York Court of
Appeals turned to commentary for suggestions on the disposition of dis-

9. Id.
10. See id.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See id.
See id.; Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 590 (2d Dep't 1997).
See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 587-88.
See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178.

15. See id.
16. See id. at 178.
17. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911
(1993). Unlike Davis, in Kass it was not necessary for the court to decide whether it
should balance the parties' interests because both parties signed informed consent agreements and an uncontested divorce document. See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
18. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
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putes involving pre-zygotes. 19 The court outlined four approaches on this
issue.20 The first approach suggested that control should be vested in one
of the gamete donors. 2' The second approach implied a contract to procreate based on the parties' involvement in an IVF program.22 The third
approach considered the gamete donors to have a "bundle of rights" relating to the pre-zygotes; the gamete donors could then exercise these
rights through "joint disposition agreements. 23 The final approached
suggested that an embryo should not be destroyed, implanted or used in
research if a person with decision-making authority objects. 24 Following
this brief description of the various approaches to25 disposing of stored
pre-zygotes, the court turned to the appeal before it.
Before addressing the central issue of the case, however, the court
disposed of the issue of whether pre-zygotes are entitled to "special respect. ' ' 26 It was not necessary to address the issue of "special respect" in
this case, reasoned the court, because the parties' agreement answered
27
the question of who has dispositional authority over the pre-zygotes.
The informed consents provided by the IVF program were signed by the
parties before cryopreservation, and manifested their intent regarding
disposition of the pre-zygotes.2 8
The central issue was "whether the consents clearly express[ed] the
parties' intent regarding disposition of the pre-zygotes in the present cir19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
24. See id. (citing NEv YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LimI AND THE LAW, ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOnMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY,

317-20 (1998)).
25. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179.

26. Id. The court also concluded that a woman's right of privacy is not implicated
with respect to the disposition of pre-zygotes, nor are pre-zygotes considered "persons"

under the Constitution. Id.
27. Id.

28. See id. at 180.
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cumstances." 29 "Agreements between progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed
valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them."30 The respondent argued that the consents clearly indicated that the pre-zygotes
should be transferred to the IVF program for research. 31 The appellant,
on the32other hand, argued that the consents were too ambiguous on this
issue.
Specifically, the appellant claimed there were two ambiguities in the
consents. 33 According to the -appellant, the first ambiguity was in
"INFORMED CONSENT NO. 2. The sentence states: "In the event of
divorce, we understand that legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes
must be determined in a property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction. ' 35 The appellant interpreted this sentence to mean: "In the event of divorce, we understand
that legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction." 36 The second ambiguity argued by appellant was that the "ADDENDUM NO. 2-1," the "STATEMENT OF
to situations involving "death or other unDISPOSITION," was limited
37
foreseen circumstances."
To resolve the issue of ambiguity, the court looked to the language of
these consents. First, it noted that the consents included words such as
"we," "us," and "our," indicating that the disposition of the pre-zygotes

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 181.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36.

Id.

37. Id. at 182. ADDENDUM No. 2-1 stated: "In the event that we [...] are unable to
make a decision regarding disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes, we now indicate
our desire for the disposition of our pre-zygotes and direct the IVF Program to examin[e]
[them] for biological studies and dispos[e] of [them] for approved research investigation
as determined by the IVF Program." Id. at 181.
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must be a joint decision. 38 Second, the court agreed with the appellate
division's resolution of the ambiguities.39 If the informed consents were
read as suggested by the appellant, the courts would have control over
the disposition of the pre-zygotes. 40 This interpretation would conflict
with the parties' intent as expressed in the informed consents. 41 Finally,
the "uncontested divorce" agreement, even though inoperative, supported42
the parties' intent to dispose of the pre-zygotes only by joint agreement.
Therefore, the court held that "the parties unequivocally manifest[ed]
their mutual intention that in the present circumstances
the pre-zygotes
' 3
be donated for research to the IVF program. A
IV.

CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals resolved the issue of how prezygotes should be disposed when the gamete donors sign informed consents agreeing to their disposition. 44 The court held that these agreements
38. Id.
39. See id. at 181-82.
40. See id. at 182.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 181-82. The court explained that extrinsic evidence cannot produce ambiguity in agreements; however, the appellate division plurality properly used the "uncontested divorce agreement' to settle any ambiguity. See id.
43. Id. at 181.
44. See id. at 180.
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should generally be enforced when there is a dispute between the parties. 45 In the case at bar, the informed consents unambiguously manithe
fested the parties' "mutual intention that in the present circumstances
46
pre-zygotes be donated for research to the IVF program."

45.
46.

See id.
Id. at 181.

Manning v. Brown1
(decided November 20, 1997)
I.

SYNOPSIS

The New York Court of Appeals held that a passenger's knowing
participation in the unauthorized use of a stolen vehicle precluded her

from maintaining her action to recover for injuries sustained as a result of
that conduct. 2
I. BACKGROUND
On April 21, 1993, plaintiff, Christina Manning, defendant, Karla
Amidon, and a third girl were riding in a truck driven by a fourth friend
when Amidon noticed a parked car belonging to Ralph and Julie Brown.3
Amidon requested that the truck be stopped so that she could search the
Browns' car for loose change.a While searching, Amidon found the keys
to the car under some papers. 5 Amidon started the car, inviting Manning
and the third friend to join her.6 After driving around for a while, Man-7
ning switched places with Amidon and began driving the Browns' car.
Later, Manning and Amidon again switched places so that Amidon was
driving.8 Manning then suggested that the radio station be adjusted. 9
While Amidon adjusted the station, the car swerved and collided with a
pole.' 0 Manning later commenced this negligence action against Amidon
and the Browns.1"

1. 689 N.E.2d 1382 (N.Y. 1997).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See id. at 1383.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Deposition testimony indicated that Amidon did not have permission
to drive the Browns' car. 12 Mr. Brown testified that he believed he had
left the extra set of keys at home in his kitchen. 13 The Browns moved for14
summary judgment based on the lack of permission to use their vehicle.
Amidon also "moved for summary judgment based upon plaintiffs participation in a serious crime."' 15 Manning filed a cross-motion for further
discovery. 16 The Supreme Court, Essex County, granted the defendants'
for
motions for summary judgment and denied the remaining requests
18
relief.17 The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed.
III.

DISCUSSION

The Court of Appeals began its analysis by restating the rule set forth
in Barker v. Kallash:'9 Where a plaintiff has engaged in a serious violation of the law and seeks recovery for injuries that are the direct result of
such conduct, recovery will be denied as a matter of public policy.20 The

court in Manning acknowledged that in Barker, conduct regulated by
statute was distinguished from conduct "entirely prohibited by law."'
The court explained that violating a statute that governs the manner in
which activities are conducted constitutes negligence, and thus the principles of comparative negligence are applicable. Therefore, a complaint
will not be dismissed simply because the plaintiff has engaged in prohibited conduct.2 2 However, where a plaintiff's injuries are "a direct result

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Seeid.
See id.
468 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1984).
See id. at 41.
Manning, 689 N.E.2d at 1384.
See id.
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of a serious violation of the law involving hazardous activities which
were not justified under the circumstances[,]" the plaintiff is precluded
from maintaining an action to recover for injuries sustained.23
After determining that Manning's injuries were the direct result of
her illegal activity, the court had to determine whether the conduct was
"such a serious violation of the law that she should be precluded, as a
matter of public policy, from recovery." 24 The court noted that joyriding
is usually accompanied by reckless or excessively fast driving, which
poses a danger not only to the participants but also to the public. 25 Therefore, joyriding is a sufficiently serious violation of law so that, as a matter of public policy, Manning was precluded
from recovery for injuries
26
sustained while engaged in that conduct.
The court next determined that the Browns were entitled to summary
judgment. The court determined that they did not violate Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1210(a), which provides that a person or driver of a vehicle shall not leave the vehicle unattended without "stopping the engine,
locking the ignition, removing the key from the vehicle ...provided,
however, the provision for removing the key from the vehicle shall not
require the removal of keys hidden from sight about the vehicle for convenience or emergency."2' 7 As Amidon testified that she had found the
keys underneath some papers and Mr. Brown testified that he believed
the keys to be at home in his kitchen, plaintiff was unable to create a factual dispute regarding concealment of the keys.2 8 The Browns were
therefore entitled to summary
judgment, and the court affirmed the order
29
of the Appellate Division.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Barker,468 N.E.2d at 42.
Manning, 689 N.E.2d at 1384.
See id. at 1384-85.
See id. at 1385.
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1210(a) (McKinney 1996).
See Manning, 689 N.E.2d at 1385.
See id.
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CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals has determined that unauthorized
use of a motor vehicle constitutes a sufficiently serious violation of the
law so as to preclude, as a matter of public policy, an action to recover
for injuries sustained as a direct result of that violation.

Johnson v. Patakil
Martinez v. Pataki
(decided December 4, 1997)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a 4-3 decision written by Chief Justice Judith Kaye, the New York
Court of Appeals narrowly upheld the Governor's executive order which
superseded and replaced a local District Attorney with the State Attorney
General in a potential death penalty prosecution.2 The Court of Appeals
also held that the matter was not rendered moot by the facts that one defendant committed suicide and that the state dropped the charges against
the other two defendants after they were prosecuted in federal court.3
II. BACKGROUND

Since 1973, the New York Legislature tried to revive the death penalty in the State of New York.4 From 1973 to 1984, the New York Court
of Appeals struck down several capital punishment statutes due to constitutional defects. 5 From 1978 to 1994, Democratic Governors Hugh Carey
and Mario Cuomo vetoed all capital punishment bills that the Legislature
passed. 6 In 1995, the New York Legislature re-enacted the death penalty
as part of a set of criminal sentencing statutes.7 Republican Governor
George Pataki signed the bill into law as he had promised during his
election campaign. 8 However, in order to withstand constitutional chal-

1. 691 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1997).
2. See infranotes 62-86 and accompanying text.
3. See infranotes 43-61 and accompanying text.
4. See 691 N.E.2d at 1015 n.4 (Smith, J., dissenting) (giving a brief history of
capital punishment in New York).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 1998).
8. See James Dao, Death Penalty in New York Reinstated After 18 Years, Pataki
Sees JusticeServed,N.Y. TIMEs, March 8, 1995, at Al.
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lenges, 9 the Legislature did not make the death penalty an automatic sentence; it is an option which the prosecution must select in a first degree
murder case. 10 The other option the provision allows is life sentence
without parole.'l
On the day the legislature passed the law, Robert Johnson, the publicly-elected Bronx District Attorney, issued a statement expressing his
views on the legislation. 12 District Attorney Johnson stated that he had
concerns about the death penalty and that, while he will exercise his discretion to aggressively pursue life without parole in every appropriate
case, it was his "present intention not to utilize the death penalty provisions of the statute." 13 Governor Pataki interpreted this as a "blanket policy" on the part of District Attorney Johnson and was concerned that Mr.
Johnson was substituting his will over the will of the Legislature and that
the statute would be14challenged as being carried out disproportionately
throughout the state.
The Governor's and the Bronx D.A.'s discord was immediately
tested in a prosecution prior to the one at issue here. In December 1995,
four months after the law became effective, a multiple homicide occurred
in the Bronx.' 5 A suspect was accused and indicted. The day after the
indictment, Governor Pataki asked Mr. Johnson if he would seek the
death penalty in these murders. 16 The Governor further asked that, if Mr.
Johnson was not seeking the death penalty, was that decision based on
the specific facts of the case or a "policy decision not to seek the death
penalty in any case in Bronx County."'17 Mr. Johnson responded that he
9. See 691 N.E. 2d at 1015 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting that "the Legislature
tread[ed] carefully"). Id.
10. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06.
11. See id.
12. See Adam Nossiter, In New York City a Mixed Response from Prosecutors,
N.Y. TIMEs, March 8, 1995, at B5.
13. Id.
14. N.Y. COME. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.27 (1996).
15. See id. (noting the prosecution of Michael Vernon).
16. See id.
17. Id.
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had reviewed the facts and intended to "exercis[e] [his] statutory discretion" and seek life without parole.18 However, Mr. Johnson did not address the question whether or not he had a "blanket policy" with regard
to capital prosecution in the Bronx. 19 Nonetheless, the Governor accepted
the Bronx D.A.'s decision "with grave reservations. 20
Four months later, the conflict between the Governor and the Bronx
D.A. culminated. On March 14, 1996, New York City Police Officer
Kevin Gillespie was killed in the line of duty in the Bronx.21 Angel Diaz
was apprehended and later indicted for first degree murder in connection
with Officer Gillespie's killing.2 2 On March 19, 1996, Governor Pataki
again asked Mr. Johnson if he would pursue the death penalty.23 The
Governor felt that this case cried out for such a sentence because the defendant had three prior felony convictions and was engaged in a robbery
spree when he allegedly killed Officer Gillespie. 24 The Governor repeated his inquiry that if Mr. Johnson would not seek the death penalty
was it because of a policy not to pursue any death penalty case in Bronx
County. 25 The Bronx D.A. responded that he had not taken a position
against the death penalty, but rather that he had numerous concerns about
the use of the option.2 6 Furthermore, the D.A. stated that his comments27
"left the door ajar, however slight, to exercise this option in the Bronx."
The D.A. did not state whether he would seek the death penalty in the
Gillespie murder, but noted that the statute allowed him to make that de18. Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1011 (1997) (Smith, J., dissenting) (giving a detailed history of the correspondence between Governor Pataki and Bronx D.A.
Johnson).
19. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.27 (1996).
20. 691 N.E.2d at 1011 (Smith, J., dissenting).
21. See 655 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465 (Ist Dep't 1997).
22. See id.
23. See N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.27.
24. See 691 N.E.2d at 1011 (Smith, J., dissenting) (giving a detailed history of the
correspondence between Governor Pataki and Bronx D.A. Johnson).
25. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.27.
26. See 691 N.E.2d at 1011-12 (Smith, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
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termination within 120 days. 28 The Governor found the Bronx D.A.'s
answer unacceptable.29
The day after receiving Mr. Johnson's response, Governor Pataki issued Executive Order No. 27.30 The Order directed the Attorney General,
Dennis Vacco, to replace and supersede District Attorney Johnson in the
investigation and prosecution of the Gillespie matter." In his Order, the
Governor stated that he was concerned that, in failing to consider the
death penalty option on a case by case basis, the Bronx D.A. was substituting his personal policy as opposed to the will of the Legislature.32 The
Governor further stated that the Bronx D.A.'s "blanket policy" would
cause the death penalty to be carried out disproportionately in New York
State and the Court of Appeals may invalidate it for this reason. 33 Thus,
the Governor felt it necessary to exercise his constitutional duty to "take
care" that the laws are properly carried out. 34 Subsequently, Mr. Vacco
the People would
notified the court and the defendant, Mr.
3 1 Diaz, that
Diaz.
Mr.
against
penalty
death
the
seek
District Attorney Johnson and several Bronx voters and taxpayers
filed separate suits to invalidate the supersession order.3 6 The Supreme
Court dismissed the petitions and found that the Governor's Order was
valid.37 Mr. Johnson and the Bronx voters appealed the decision. The
Appellate Division affirmed. 38 The Appellate Court found Executive Or28. See id. at 1012.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
tion).

N.Y. COMP. CODES P. & REGS. fit. 9, § 5.27.
See 691 N.E.2d at 1012 (Smith, J. dissenting).
See id.
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.27.
See id.
Id. (referring to a governor's duty under art. IV § 3 of New York's Constitu-

35. See 691 N.E.2d at 1004.
36. See id.
37. The dismissal order was a one page unpublished document by Howard Silver,
J., Supreme Court, Bronx County, dated July 18, 1996. See Johnson v. Pataki, 655
N.Y.S.2d 463, 467 (1st Dep't. 1997).

38. See 655 N.Y.S.2d 463.

NEW YORK LA WSCHOOL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 43

der No. 27 valid and furthermore found that the Governor had ample basis for the Order. 39 Mr. Johnson and the Bronx County voters appealed
again.
In the meantime, Mr. Diaz committed suicide in his jail cell before
his trial for Officer Gillespie's murder.40 Furthermore, his accomplices,
Jesus Mendez and Ricardo Morales, were indicted in federal court on
federal charges. 4 1 As a result, the state charges against them were
dropped. 42
II.

DIsCuSSION

A. Mootness
Before proceeding with an analysis of the Governor's superseder order, the Court of Appeals first had to address the threshold issue of
mootness. The Attorney General argued that Mr. Diaz's suicide and the
dismissal of state charges against Messrs. Mendez and Morales had rendered the case moot.43 Despite these facts, the Court held that the case
was not moot.44
The mootness doctrine holds that where the rights of the parties are
not directly affected by the determination of the appeal or where the
court's adjudication will have no legal impact on the parties, the case is
moot. 45 The doctrine "forbids courts to pass on academic, hypothetical,
moot, or otherwise abstract questions ... .,46 Therefore, an appeal pre-

39. See id.at 466 (stating that the Governor's intervention was "fully justified").
40. See 691 N.E.2d at 1004.
41. See id.

42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. ("We first reject the Attorney-General's contention that this appeal has
been mooted by the death of Diaz, the conviction of Mendez and Morales on Federal
charges, and the dismissal of the State indictments against these two defendants.").
45. See Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 409 N.E.2d 876, 877-878 (N.Y. 1980).
46. Id.at 877.
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of the parties will be directly
sents a live controversy where the rights
47
determination.
court's
the
by
affected
The Court held that the case was not moot for two reasons. First, the
Court reasoned that "live controversies" still existed in the matter of expenses of the Diaz prosecution. 48 The Governor's Executive Order stated
that, pursuant to Executive Law § 63(2), Bronx County had to reimburse
the Attorney General for expenses incurred during the prosecution. 9
However, if the superseder order was held invalid, the Attorney General's Office could not properly claim any reimbursement. 50 Thus, the
figure out if Bronx
Court reasoned that the matter must be settled so as to 51
County owed the Attorney General's Office any costs.
Second, the Court found that the Executive Order was not limited to
the prosecution at issue. 2 The Court reasoned that the Bronx D.A. "may
find it necessary to initiate additional proceedings ... if the Executive
Order was invalidated." 53 Hence, if a similar case arose in the future, the
Bronx D.A. would need to know whether the Governor can supersede
again.54 Therefore, the matter must be settled so as to provide guidance
on each party's role in similar future situations.55
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Smith provides a valid counterargument against the Court's reasoning. For Judge Smith, the case was
"clearly moot" because there were no "live question[s]" presented.5 6
47.

See 691 N.E.2d at 1004 (citing Matter ofHearstCorp.).

48. Id.
49.

See N.Y. CONT. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.27 (citing Executive Law

§

63(2)).
50. See 691 N.E.2d at 1004 ("[T]he validity of the charges depends on the validity
of the order ....).
51. See id. ("[T]he appeal continues to have immediate consequence for the par-

ties."). Id.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See id.; see also id. at 1012-13 (Smith, J., dissenting) (interpreting the Court's

ruling).
55. See id. at 1010.
56. Id. at 1012-13.
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Judge Smith notes that the Attorney General's Office had not asked for
any reimbursement from Bronx County.57 Furthermore, the issue of costs
reimbursement was not "independently significant" to except the mootness doctrine. 58 Judge Smith also noted that the issue before the Court
was the validity of the Governor's superseder order which dealt with Officer Gillespie's murder and the prosecution of Messrs. Diaz, Morales,
and Mendez.59 Therefore, Judge Smith reasoned that the Court's argument about whether the Bronx D.A. may face a similar situation again
was "speculative. ' 60 Hence, this speculation did not except the mootness
courts" to engage in "hypothetical ... or otherdoctrine which "forbids ' 61
wise abstract questions.
B. Superseder
After quickly dispensing with the mootness issue, the Court addressed the primary issue: whether Governor Pataki's Executive Order
No. 27, which superseded the Bronx D.A. in the Gillespie murder prosecution, was valid. Since the Governor's authority to supersede is not a
novel issue in New York,62 the Court first reviewed the law regarding the
Governor's superseder authority. After analyzing Executive Order No.
27 "on its face," the Court held that the Order was valid.63 Based on the
rule of law, the Court could have stopped there. However, just as the
lower courts analyzed the Governor's reasons for issuing the Order, the
64
Court of Appeals felt compelled to also review the Governor's reasons.
The law regarding the Governor's superseder power states that
57. See id. at 1013 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting further that there was no indication that the Attorney General would ever request reimbursement from the Bronx).
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 409 N.E.2d 876, 877 (N.Y. 1980).
62. See 691 N.E.2d at 1005 (citing several cases regarding a governor's supersession of a district attorney).
63. See id. at 1005-06.
64. Id. at 1004, 1007.
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"when the Governor acts by Executive Order pursuant to a valid grant 'of
65
discretionary authority, his actions are largely beyond judicial review.
In such cases, a court is limited to determining whether New York's
Constitution or New York's Legislature has empowered the Governor to
act.66 A court cannot review the manner in which the Governor chooses
67
to act, and the Governor is not required to explain the choices made.
However, in Mulroy v. Carey,68 the Court of Appeals "reserved the possibility that in some undefined circumstance" New York's courts could
invalidate a Governor's order.69
In the instant case, the Court found that article IV, § 370 of the New
York Constitution and Executive Law § 63(2)71 both provided the Governor with authority to supersede a District Attorney in a matter. 72 Article
IV, § 3 imposes on the Governor the duty to "take care that the laws are
faithfully executed." 73 Executive Law § 63(2) orders the Attorney General "[w]henever required by the governor" to "conduc[t] ... criminal
actions or proceedings... which the district attorney would otherwise be
authorized or required to exercise or perform .... 74
Based on article IV, § 3 and Executive Law § 63(2), the Court of
Appeals held Governor Pataki's Executive Order No. 27 valid.75 The
Court reasoned that "on its face" the Order "reflect[ed] the authority
granted [to] the Governor." 76 Since a court cannot review the manner in

65. Id. at 1004.
66. See id. at 1005.

67. See id.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

373 N.E.2d 369 (N.Y. 1977).
691 N.E.2d at 1005 (citingMulroy).
N.Y. CONST. art IV, § 3 (McKinney 1987).
N.Y. Exilc. LAW § 63(2) (McKinney 1993).
See 691 N.E.2d at 1005-06.
N.Y. CONsT. art IV, § 3.
N.Y. Exac. LAW § 63(2) (McKinney 1993).
See 691 N.E.2d at 1005-06.
Id.
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which the Governor chose to act,7 7 the Court could have stopped there.
Indeed, the Court implicitly kept open the question "reserved" in Mulroy
noting that it need not review the Governor's reasons here and explicitly
noted that it was not setting any standard for review of the Governor's
actions. 78
However, even while acknowledging that the Governor "is not
obliged to state reasons for superseder," the Court continued its analysis. 79 The Court found that even if the Governor's action was subject to
judicial review, Executive Order No. 27 was still valid.80 The Court reasoned that the Order was supported by the Governor's reasons that there
was a threat to faithful execution of the death penalty law.8 l The Governor stated that he was concerned that the Bronx D.A. was substituting his
personal policy for the will of the Legislature by not considering the
death penalty option on a case by case basis.8 2 The Governor further
stated that the Bronx D.A.'s refusal to pursue the death penalty in any
cases would cause the death penalty to be carried out disproportionately
throughout the State thus risking invalidation from the Court.8 3 The
Court found that Mr. Johnson "never unequivocally disavowed" that he
had a blanket policy against the death penalty. 4 As such, the Governor's
superseder did not lack a "rational basis. '8 5 Thus, the Court affirmed and
agreed with the trial court and the Appellate Division that Executive Order No. 27 was valid and had ample basis for support.8 6

77. See id. at 1005.
78. Id. at 1003, 1005-06, 1007 ("We need not define whether a standard of review,
if one is applicable at all, should be reasonableness, necessity or some other standard.")
79. Id. at 1007.
80. See id.at 1003.
81. See id.at 1007.

82. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R & RFGs. tit. 9, § 5.27.
83. See id.
84. 691 N.E.2d at 1008.
85. Id.
86. See id.at 1007.
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C. Appellants 'AdditionalArguments
In addressing the appellants' additional arguments, the Court also
clarified some issues of law. District Attorney Johnson and the Bronx
voters argued that since the Bronx D.A. is an elected official and a constitutional officer, he has exclusive authority to prosecute crimes in the
Bronx.8 7 The Court countered that, although the New York Constitution
provides for the offices of Governor, Attorney General, and District Attorney, it does not delineate responsibilities among them. 8 The Court
noted that the delineation of duties has historically been left to the Legislature. 89 In turn, the Legislature has "recognized" the authority of the
Attorney General to prosecute cases at the local level when directed by
the Governor.9" Hence, the Bronx D.A. does not have exclusive authority
to prosecute crimes in Bronx County.
District Attorney Johnson also argued that the Legislature granted
"unfettered discretion" to the local district attorneys to determine
whether or not to seek the death penalty.91 Therefore, the Governor cannot supersede and make that determination. 92 Judge Titone agreed with
this argument in his dissent.93 However, the Court noted that while the
Legislature enacted a provision in the sentencing statutes whereby a district attorney can request the Attorney General to assist in a death penalty
prosecution, 94 the Legislature left the Governor's supersession power
intact in the same section.95 Thus, the Court reasoned that the Legislature
did not intend for the district attorneys' discretion to negate the Gover-

87.

See id. at 1006.

88. See id.; see also N.Y. CoNsT. art IV, § 3 (McKinney 1987).
89. See 691 N.E.2d at 1006.
90. Id. (citing Executive Law § 63).
91. Id. at 1007.
92. See id. at 1007 (noting the argument that the Governor was substituting his
policy choice for the District Attorney's).
93. See id. at 1008-10 (Titone, J., dissenting).
94. See N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 63-d (McKinney 1993).
95. See 691 N.E.2d at 1007.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 43

96
nor's supersession power.
District Attorney Johnson further argued that newly enacted Executive Law § 63-d9 7 allowed the Attorney General to "assist" the D.A. only
when "requested by the District Attorney.0 8 Mr. Johnson argued that
this provision in the new sentencing statutes implicitly repealed Executive Law § 63(2) superseder in first degree murder prosecutions.9 9 The
Court countered that the two statutes are complimentary; they merely
provide two different ways for the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial authority in the State. 0'° Furthermore, the Court stated that
"[n]othing in or about that [new] section evinces a legislative intention to
limit a Governor's supersession authority."'' 1 Hence, the newly enacted
Executive Law § 63-d did not repeal Executive Law § 63(2) in first degree murder cases.

IV. CONCLUSION
0 2 the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the rule that
In Johnson v. Pataki,1
when the Governor acts by executive order, judicial review is limited to
determining whether the State Constitution or the Legislature has given
the Governor the authority to act.10 3 In the case of supersession of a District Attorney, the Governor has been granted discretionary authority to
supersede by Article IV § 3 of the Constitution and Executive Law §
63(2).1°4 However, the Court still "reserved" the possibility that in some

96. See id. ("[T]he Legislature also left unchanged the long-standing authority
vested in the Governor to supersede a District Attorney in a particular matter.").
97. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 63-d (McKinney 1993).
98. 691 N.E.2d at 1006.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. 691 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1997).
103. See supra notes 62-86 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 62-86 and accompanying text.
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undefined circumstances a court could invalidate an executive order.10 5
The Court of Appeals also arguably broadened the mootness doctrine. Parties could now argue that a case is not moot because the issue of
parties' cost reimbursement has not been decided. 10 6 Parties may also
is not moot because a similar situation may arise again
argue that a case
10 7
them.
between

105. See supra notes 62-86 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.

Raquet v. Braun'
(decided June 5, 1997)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision,2 the New York State Court of Appeals held
that where a statutory cause of action by injured firefighters was authorized only against those persons who were in control of the premises
where the fire occurred at the time of the accident, a third party action for
indemnification by the defendants lies, even though the injured firefighters would
not have a direct cause of action against the third party defen3
dant.
II. BACKGROUND
One firefighter, Mitchell Spoth, was killed, and another, Frank
Raquet, was injured, 4 when a canopy roof and a portion of masonry wall
on a building addition collapsed outward during the course of a fire. 5
Mitchell Spoth's representative and Frank Raquet sued the building
owner, the building's tenants, and the contractors who had designed and
built the addition. The plaintiffs' alleged that the contractors violated
several sections of the New York State Building Construction Code in
constructing the addition, and that such violations which would render
the building permit null and void. 7 Further, plaintiffs alleged that the masonry contractor failed to leave openings in the wall to allow for its
proper connection to the roof.8 In accord with General Municipal Law §
205-a(3), the claims against the contractors were dismissed, 9 while the

1. 681 N.E.2d 404 (N.Y. 1997).
2. Judge Wesley took no part in this decision. See id. at 409.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See id. at 407.
See id.at 406.
See id.
See id.
See id.

8.

See Raque, 681 N.E.2d at 409.

9. See id. at 406.
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claims against the owner and the tenants were allowed to proceed. 1° The
building's owner and tenants then sought indemnification from the contractors." The Supreme Court, Erie County, denied the motions for indemnification 12 and the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed. 13 The 4Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to the Supreme Court.1
IH.

DIscussIoN

The court, with Judge Titone writing for the majority, began its
analysis by examining the firefighter's right of action.' 5 General Municipal Law § 205-a creates a right of action for firefighters where the negligence of any person in failing to comply with the requirements of any
statute, ordinance or rule, directly causes the firefighter's injury or
death. 16 This section was enacted to ameliorate the harsh effects of the
in common
"firefighter's rule,"' 17 which bars firefighters from recovering
i8
law negligence for injuries sustained in the line of duty.
Despite the statutory language referring to the negligence of "any
person or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of
the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal,
state, county, village, town or city governments . . .,19 the Court of Ap-

10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. Raquet v. Braun, 607 N.Y.S.2d 799 (4th Dep't 1994).
14. See Raquet, 681 N.E.2d at 409.
15. See id. at 406.
16. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-a (McKinney 1997).
17. David L. Strauss, Comment, Where There's Smoke, There's the Firefighter's
Rule: Containingthe ConflagrationAfter One Hundred Years, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 2031,
2034 (outlining the history, development and implementation of the firefighter's rule).
18. See Zangh v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Commn., 649 N.E.2d 1167, 1171 (N.Y.
1995).
19. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-a.
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peals in Kenavan v. City of New York2 held that General Municipal Law
§ 205-a liability could be asserted only against property owners or others
having control of the premises where the firefighting takes place.21 In
applying this principle to the facts in Raquet,22 the Court of Appeals
stated that while clearly the owner of the premises may be held directly
liable under General Municipal Law § 205-a, 23 the contractors could be
held liable only if they were in control of the premises at the time of the
injury.24 Noting that the contractors had completed their work on the
building twelve years prior to the date of the fire, the court dismissed the
firefighters' direct causes of action against the contractors. 25 Following
this dismissal, the owner and tenants filed their claim for indemnification
against the contractors.26
Before considering the indemnification issue, the Court of Appeals
was careful to note that its prior decision in this case was not a dismissal
on the merits of the claims against the contractors.27 The disposition was
limited to a holding that the firefighters could not recover against the
29
contractors; 28 the indemnification issue had not been raised at that time.
In its decision, the court focused on the principle that a defendant
may seek contribution from a third party even if the injured plaintiff has
no direct right of recovery against that party.30 The court found the basis
for that principle in Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Compania Transatlantic
Espanola:31 "[E]very one is responsible for the consequences of his own

20.

517 N.E.2d 872 (N.Y. 1987).

21.

See id.at875.

22. See Raquet, 681 N.E.2d at 404.
23. See Zanghi, 649 N.E.2d at 1175.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 1176.
26. See Raquet, 681 N.E.2d at 406.

27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.

30.
31.

See id. at 407.
31 N.E. 987 (N.Y. 1892).
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negligence, and, if another person has been compelled (by the judgment
of a court having jurisdiction) to pay the damages which ought to have
been paid by the wrongdoer, they may be recovered from him.' 32 When
considering apportionment, it is critical that the breach of duty by the
contributing party must have had a part in causing the injury for which
contribution is sought.3 3 Ordinarily, the party from whom contribution is

sought will have breached a duty owed directly to the injured party,3 4 but
in more unusual cases the right to apportionment may arise from the duty
owed by the contributing party to the party seeking contribution. 35 In
such cases, indemnity is appropriate because of a separate duty owed the
to the indemnitee by the indemnitor.3 6
The court stated that the purpose of General Municipal Law § 205-a
was to overcome the firefighters rule and allow firefighters to recover in
tort for their injuries.37 The court found nothing written into the statute
which would prevent a party who is forced to answer in damages from
burden to those whose negligent acts actually
shifting the economic
38
caused the harm.

32. Id. at 989.
33. See Nassau Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Facilities Improvement Corp., 523
N.E.2d 803, 805 (N.Y. 1988).
34. See id.
35. See Guzman v. Haven Plaza Housing Dev. Fund Co., 509 N.E.2d 51, 54, 55
n.5 (N.Y. 1987).
36. See Mas v. Two Bridges Assocs., 554 N.E.2d 1257, 1263 (N.Y. 1990).
37. SeeRaquet, 681 N.E.2dat408.
38. See id.

368
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CONCLUSION

A person who is held liable to an injured firefighter under General
Municipal Law § 205-a(3), because they are in possession or control of
the premises where the injury occurs, may have a cause of action against
third parties responsible for violations of building codes or other laws if
such violations contributed to the injury. The mere fact that the injured
firefighters could not directly sue such persons will not serve to bar indemnifications.

Sayeh R., andAnother, ChildrenAlleged to Be
Neglected v. Monroe County Departmentof SocialServices, Appellant,
PatriciaAnn P., Respondent'
(decided December 22, 1997)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In an effort to protect infants from harm, the New York Court of Appeals held, in a 4-3 decision, that, in a child protective proceeding
brought under Article 10 of the Family Court Act ("the Act"), the New
York Family Court had subject matter jurisdiction and properly asserted
its personal jurisdiction over a Florida mother. The court allowed the
Department of Social Services (DSS) to bring an action that could potentially effectuate a change in custody. The court found no legal conflicts
with respect to custody determinations or federal law, since child protective proceedings brought under the Act are expressly excluded from custody determinations under both the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act(PKPA) 2 and the state Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
3 rendering both inapplicable. 4
(UCCJA)
II.

BACKGROUND

Abmad R. and Patricia P. married in Florida in 1980 and had three
children (two girls and one boy) during their marriage. They divorced in
1986, and Patricia was designated "the primary custodial parent." 5 The
children remained with Patricia, and Abmad moved to Rochester, New
York. In 1988, Raymond Wike, "a former boyfriend or acquaintance" of
Patricia's, waited for Patricia to fall asleep and then removed the two
girls from their bedroom, after which he attacked, raped, and repeatedly
stabbed them.6 The younger girl was killed; the older girl, Sayeh, sur-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

693 N.E.2d 724 (N.Y. 1997).
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1998).
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW Ch. 14,Art. 5-A, § 75 (McKinney 1988).
See Sayeh R., 693 N.E.2d at 727.
Id. at 726.

6. Id.
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vived by pretending she was dead. 7 As a result of the incident, the following year the Florida court changed the custody order to make Ahmad
the primary custodial parent, reserving liberal visitation rights to Patricia
during the summer and Christmas holidays.8
For the following eight years, the two surviving children lived with
Ahmad as New York domiciliaries. 9 During the first three years, 1990 to
1993, the children visited Patricia during summers and Christmas holidays.' 0 Over the years, the children had adjusted well in New York, with
the "love, guidance, and emotional support" of Abmad, their stepmother,
and the children born of Ahmad's second marriage." Unfortunately,
there were "corroborated allegations" that during the children's visits
with her, Patricia had abused them both verbally and physically, and sub12
sequently, the children said that they no longer wanted to visit her.
Through their guardian ad litem, the children filed a New York petition
to prevent their removal from New York, and sought elimination of
Patricia's visitation rights.' 3 Subsequently, Patricia went to Ahmad's
house in Rochester with a New York police officer to enforce her visitation rights over the Christmas holiday. She was refused visitation and
told that the children did not want to see her.14
Patricia then attempted to enforce her visitation rights in contempt
proceedings against Ahmad in the Florida court system, and in 1997, after several contempt orders had been issued against Abmad for his refusal to comply with Patricia's visitation rights, the Florida court
changed the custody order and again granted primary custody back to

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 731 n.1 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 726.

12. Id.
13. See id. at 732 n.2 (Smith, J., dissenting). The petition was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. See id. (citing Matter of Mott v. Patricia Ann R., 691 N.E.2d 623 (N.Y.

1997)).
14. See id. at 726.
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Patricia.15 In New York, Ahmad attempted to modify the Florida court
order, without success. 16
DSS commenced the present action in New York Family Court,
stressing that "as a result of the prior trauma, the children have weakened
psychological functioning and.. .serious psychological and emotional
pathologies, which would be further severely aggravated by [Patricia's]
efforts to obtain temporary and permanent custody.' 17 Nonetheless, the
Family Court granted Patricia's motion to dismiss, holding that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over Patricia, and that even if Patricia's attempt to recover custody was harmful to the children, that was not sufficient to constitute neglect as to bring the case within the scope of Family
Court jurisdiction.18 The court also concluded that the UCCJA was inapplicable, and that the federal PKPA precluded modification of the Florida
court's order granting custody to Patricia "1 9
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed, based solely
on the issue of personal jurisdiction, since basing a finding of neglect in
New York as the result of attempted enforcement of a valid Florida visitation or custody order would create interstate custody conflicts, which
"would encourage conversion of private custody disputes into child protective proceedings. 20
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding, in sum, that "New York
interest in assuring the safety and well-being of its
State has a compelling
21
domiciliaries."
III.

DISCUSSION

The court began its analysis by distinguishing a custody dispute that
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See id.
See id; see also Mott, 691 N.E.2d at 623.
Sayeh R., 693 N.E.2d at 726.
See In the Matterof S.R., 657 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (Fam.Ct. 1997).
See id. at 887, 889.
MatterofSayeh R., 659 N.Y.S.2d 590, 591 (4th Dep't 1997).
Sayeh R., 693 N.E.2d at 727.
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implicates the PKPA and UCCJA, which would result in Florida's retention ofjurisdiction, from a child protective proceeding based on neglect,
which implicates the Family Court Act and brings the action within the
subject matter jurisdiction-and Patricia within the personal jurisdiction-of the Family Court. 22 The court noted that there had been no attempt to modify the Florida court's custody determination, even though,
on its face, the result seemed to circumvent the PKPA and the New York
UCCJA. Rather, the court explained, DSS acted pursuant to its statutory
command to investigate alleged "abuse and mistreatment," and while
Patricia had a right to enforce valid Florida court orders, such enforcement would be without regard to the children's "special vulnerabilities,"
and thus could give rise to a finding of neglect on Patricia's part for failing to provide the "minimum degree of care" given her children's special
needs after the horrors they had experienced years earlier while in
Patricia's care.23
The court was also persuaded by the testimony of an independent
child psychologist presented by DSS, and not prompted by either parent,
who found that both children suffered clinical disorders and predicted
further diminution of their mental health, ranging from major depression
to massive personality disorganization, if Patricia supplanted Ahmad as
the custodial parent.2 4 Thus, while Patricia had a legal right to enforce
visitation, the court found her lack of sensitivity to these "exceptional
circumstances and special vulnerabilities"-and her insistence on an
immediate change in custody rather than a gradual, preparatory, super22. See id. at 727 ("[B]ecause the parties involved and the relief sought in this
child protective proceeding are quite distinct from those of a custody dispute, this child
protective proceeding is not a 'custody determination' within the meaning of the PKPA
or New York's UCCJA. We further note New York UCCJA's express exclusion of child
protective proceedings from its definition of 'custody proceedings") (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 728 (citing Family Court Act § 1012(h): "'Impairment of emotional
health' and 'impairment of mental or emotional condition' includes a state of substantially diminished psychological or intellectual functioning" as the result of Patricia's
failure "to exercise a minimum degree of care toward the child[ren]").
24. See id. (citing the expert's testimony: "nothing [could] be more terrifying and
traumatic for Sayeh tha[n] to return her to the place where her sister was raped and murdered and where she was raped, physically assaulted and left for dead").
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vised restoration of visitation-was sufficient to fall below the requisite
minimum degree of care.25
Finally, the court expressed its awareness of the potential for child
protective proceedings to be used as a device to overturn a valid custody
decision of another state, but gave assurances that "New York courts and
child protective agencies will be vigilant against any such abuse ... in
the future. '26 The court then disposed of the personal jurisdiction issue
and granted jurisdiction to New York, which subsequently brought
Patricia within the grasp of New York's long-arm statute.
The court based its findings on Family Court Act § 1036(c), since the
children are domiciled within New York, and factually it was "sufficiently supported" that the alleged abuse or neglect occurred within New
York.27 The court also noted that Patricia's prior invocation of the "aid
and protection" of New York courts via cross-moving and an attorney's
affidavit in 1996, as well as the aid of a local New York police officer to
enforce visitation, were sufficient to avail her of the benefits of the New
York courts and law enforcement.2 8 As a result, she fell within New
York's long-arm jurisdiction.2 9 Consequently, the court reversed and remitted the case to the Family Court.30
IV. THE DISSENTS
Judge Smith's dissent stressed the majority's disregard for comity
and public policy, its incorrect application of long-arm jurisdiction, and
placed further emphasis on the resulting vitiation of current law and the
potential for anyone in an action involving children to invoke protective
proceedings as a platform for a child custody determination based on

25. Id. at 729. The court noted its lack of approbation of the father's interference

with visitation. See id. at n.2.
26. Id. at 730.
27. Id.

28. Id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 730-31.
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neglect.
Judge Smith argued that Patricia was left with no alternative, other
than entirely to relinquish her rights, and thus urgently sought immediate
enforcement of her rights in contempt proceedings against Ahmad as a
matter of necessity. His dissent also contended that Abmad prevented the
enforcement of Patricia's court-ordered parental right to visitation, and
noted the legal discrepancy created by Patricia's patently valid enforcement of the order and Ahmad's extralegal lack of compliance with the
order, which naturally precipitated her actions. 32 Moreover, Patricia's
impetus for turning aggressively to the courts for enforcement of the
Florida order was due to Ahmad's recalcitrance, evidenced by Sayeh's
discontinued counseling in 1992, and Ahmad's refusal to allow Patricia's
visits with the children in New York despite court orders and his prior
agreement to do so. 3 3 Thus, Judge Smith argued, Patricia's actions did
not constitute neglect sufficient to bring her within scope of New York's
personal jurisdiction and, as a result, Florida ought'to continue its exercise of original jurisdiction based on "principles of comity and public
policy" and that which is "in the best interests of the children. 34
Additionally, Judge Smith argued, Patricia's defensive litigation efforts in New York were not sufficient to confer long-arm jurisdiction or
to establish minimum contacts to confer personal jurisdiction. 35 Alternatively, he opined, the neglect was caused by the Florida court's order
requiring the children's relocation to Florida rather than any of Patricia's
actions? 6 Judge Smith noted that the Florida court did, in fact, order
gradual, short, supervised visits, and that Patricia's aggressive defensive
litigation posture flowed from Ahmad's lack of compliance with those
orders and was, in reality, the "antithesis of 'neglect, ' 37 and also that

31. See id. at 731-37 (Smith, J., dissenting).
32. See id. at 731 (Smith, J., dissenting).
33. See id. at 731-32 (Smith, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 731 (Smith, J., dissenting).

35. See id. at 734 (Smith, J., dissenting).
36. See id. (Smith, J., dissenting).

37. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
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Patricia's visits to New York represented her willingness to comply with
those orders.38
Finally, the dissent argued that the majority's holding must, by its
own terms, modify the Florida court's custody ruling, which runs afoul
of Congress' intent that the PKPA extend the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution3 9 to interstate custody determinations in order
'
to prevent "[p]itting the courts of two jurisdictions against each other. AO
In the instant case, the Florida court sought to enforce its own orders, and
Ahmad ignored those orders with impunity.41 Judge Smith also noted the
importance of maintaining parent-child relationships, and stressed that
especially
children's preferences should be considered with caution,
42
where the relationship between the parents is acrimonious.
Judge Bellacosa wrote a separate dissent to stress the comity and
public policy issues and the paucity of "a legally cognizable basis" to
mandate reversal of the Appellate Division.43 He placed particular emphasis on the implications of this case beyond the fact that Abmad has
managed "to juxtapose the judicial processes of two States against one
another, while [gaining] the strategic upper hand in the continuing litigation activity[.] ' " 4 He posited that a new standard of neglect has been established based "on a novel concept of 'special vulnerabilities ' AS and
suggests that New York has not borne its "huge threshold burden" to al46
low the alteration of the Florida court's determination, in turn "signifithe States that ought to be
cantly impair[ing] the comity covenant 'among
7
the hallmark of custody determinations. A

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id.at 735 (Smith, J., dissenting).
U.S. CoNsT. art. W, § 1.
Sayeh R., 693 N.E.2d at 736.
See id.(Smith, J., dissenting).
See id. at 736 n. 7 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 737 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
Id. at 739 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
Id. at 738 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
Id. at 739 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).

47. Id. at 740.
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CONCLUSION

The implications of the court's holding are far-reaching. Although
ostensibly the majority's holding delineates New York's duty and willingness to protect its own infant residents, child protective proceedings
in New York, under Article 10 of the Family Court Act, may now "allow
New York to exercise jurisdiction affecting parental custody/visitation
rights even though New York does not qualify as the child's home
state. '48 Consequently, these holdings on subject matter and personal
jurisdiction, although presently the result of extraordinary facts, may in
the future be "applied to situations49never contemplated when the Court of
Appeals made its determination.

48. MatterofS.M.R., 220N.Y.L.J. 33 (Dec. 14, 1998).
49. Myrna Felder, Court Renders FourMajor Decisions, 220 N.Y.L.J. S5 (Oct. 5
1998).

Szczerbiak v. Pilat1
(decided October 23, 1997)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that a
police officer who struck a bicyclist, while responding to a report of a
group of males fighting, was entitled to immunity under Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1104, even though the officer had not activated his siren or
emergency lights at the time of the collision.2
11. BACKGROUND
On December 7, 1992, plaintiffs' decedent, 16 year old Eric Szczer-3
biak, was riding a bicycle in the Town of Cheektowaga in Erie County.
He attempted to cross Dick Road from a mid-block parking lot driveway,
rather than from an intersection.4 Officer Pilat was responding to a report
of five males fighting in a cemetery a few miles from the accident scene. 5
Officer Pilat entered Dick Road in the rightmost lane, approximately
eight hundred feet from the accident scene, and accelerated past drivers
in the passing lane,6 without engaging his siren or emergency lights.7
Testimony placed the speed of the vehicle at between thirty-nine and
fifty-five miles per hour at the time of impact.8 Officer Pilat testified that
he struck Eric Szczerbiak "'while glancing down from the road momentarily to turn on his emergency lights and headlights." 9 The family
brought suit for wrongful death and the Supreme Court, Erie County,

1. 686 N.E.2d 1346 (N.Y. 1997).
2. See id. at 1347-49.

3. See id. at 1348.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. (describing the officer's actions as designed to prevent an accident from
traffic moving into the right lane from the passing lane).
8. See id.
9. Id.
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dismissed the complaint.' ° The Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
affirmed." The Appellate Division, in a memorandum opinion, added
to attach liability to
that "a momentary lapse ofjudgement" is not enough
2
the defendant under the "reckless disregard" test.'
III. DISCUSSION
The issue that the New York State Court of Appeals considered is
whether the "defendant's conduct in driving the automobile rose to the
level of 'reckless disregard' for the safety of others required by [New
York State] Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) to impose liability upon
drivers of emergency vehicles."' 3 Judge Ciparick, writing for the court,
began the analysis by discussing the emergency vehicle privilege.' 4 New
York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 provides a qualified privilege
for drivers of emergency vehicles to disregard the ordinary rules and
regulations that bind other motorists.' 5 The qualification is stated in §
1104(e): the driver of an emergency vehicle is not relieved of a "duty to
drive with due regard for the safety of all persons", 16 nor is the driver
protected from the "consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety
of others.' 7
The Court of Appeals interpreted the reckless disregard standard in
the comralanion decisions of Saarinen v. Kerr'8 and Campbell v. City of
Elmira.' In Saarinen, a police officer observed a van running a stop sign

10.
11.
12.
(quoting
13.
14.

See id.
See Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 645 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (4th Dep't 1996).
Szczerbiak, 686 N.E.2d at 1348; Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 257
Saarinen v. Kerr, 644 N.E.2d 988 (1994)).
Szcerbiak, 686 N.E.2d at 1347.
See id. at 1349.

15. See N.Y. VEH. &TRAP.
16.

LAW

Id. § 1104(e).

17. Id.
18. 644 N.E.2d 988 (N.Y. 1994).
19.

644 N.E:2d 993 (N.Y. 1994).

§ 1104(a), (b)(McKinney 1997).
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while being operated in a reckless manner.20 The officer followed the van
into a parking lot and activated his emergency lights. 21 Rather than stop,
the van pulled away. 22 The officer pursued the van and turned on his silight,24 then
ren. 23 The van pulled out onto a public road, ran
25 a steady red
plaintiff.
collided with a vehicle driven by the
Plaintiff brought suit against the officer's employer, the Village of
Massena, contending that the village should be vicariously liable for the
officer's lack of due care in pursuing the van.26
In a case of first impression, 27 the Court of Appeals held that a police
officer's conduct in pursuing a suspected lawbreaker may not form the
basis of civil liability to an injured bystander unless the officer acted in
reckless disregard for the safety of others.2 8 In contrast to an ordinary
negligence claim, which requires merely showing a lack of due care under the circumstances,2 9 the standard of reckless disregard demands more
than this. It requires evidence that "the actor has intentionally done an act
of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that
was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow,"30
and has done so with conscious indifference to the outcome.3 '
The court reached this conclusion by examining the legislative intent
behind Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104. The court reasoned that had the

20.

See Saarinen, 644 N.E.2d at 989.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

26. See id.
27. See id. at 991 (stating that this case presents a "question of statutory interpretation [faced] for the first time").
28. See id.

29. See id.
30. Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAvID
G. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 34 at 213 (5th ed.n 1984)).
31. SeeSaarinen,644 N.E.2d at 991.
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legislature intended that the less demanding standard of due care be applicable to the drivers of emergency vehicles, the statutory language
mentioning a "duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons' 32 would have sufficed. The legislature went beyond that formulation, drafting a provision specifically dealing with the consequences of
reckless disregard. 33 The court took this as an indication that the legislature intended a more exacting standard than the traditional due care formula.34
The Court of Appeals considered the same issue of reckless disregard in Campbell v. City ofElmira,3 5 which was decided the same day as
Saarinen.The emergency vehicle in Campbellwas a fire truck. The truck
was responding to a general alarm 36 when it proceeded through an intersection against a red traffic light.37 The truck was traveling at a speed of
38
ten to fifteen miles per hour as it proceeded through the intersection.
The plaintiff, Campbell, entered the intersection on a motorcycle with the
green traffic light in his favor, 9 and struck the fire truck's rear wheel.40
At trial, conflicting testimony was offered as to whether the driver of
the fire truck ever looked in the direction from which the plaintiff was
approaching the intersection,4 1 whether the truck was accelerating or decelerating while in the intersection, 42 whether the truck's siren or air horn
was heard,43 and whether the fire truck's driver even knew what color the

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
See id. at 992.
See id.
See Campbell,644 N.E.2d at 993.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 995.
See id.

43.

See id.
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traffic light was when he entered the intersection. 44 The jury returned a
affirmed, 46 finding
verdict for the plaintiff,4 and the Appellate Division
47
evidence.
the
the verdict rationally supported by
On review, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the reckless disregard
standard requires the presence of the customary features of recklessness,
such as a general intent in connection with the alleged wrongdoer's actions, and disregard of a known or obvious risk so great as to make it
highly probable that harm would follow. 48 The court agreed that parties
might be found to have acted in violation of the statutory formulation if
they consciously-with general intent, not necessarily with intent to
cause particular injury-disregarded known serious risks of harm.49 The
court upheld the jury's verdict that the fire truck's driver had "intentionally violated the statutory mandate when he recklessly flaunted the risks
of proceeding in an emergency setting into an intersection against a red
light, indifferently and in disregard of any modicum of statutorily required attentiveness." 50
The court distinguished this decision from the decision in Saarinen.1
It contrasted the "cautiously progressive series of actions taken by the
police officer in Saarinen' 52 with the fire truck driver's "more flagrant,
nuanced and complex, conscious violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law
§ 1104(e)."5 3
Judge Titone filed a dissenting opinion in Campbell, which was

44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. (citing Campbell v. City of Elmira, 604 N.Y.S.2d 609 (3rd Dep't

1993)).
47. See Campbell,644 N.E.2d at 995.
48. See id.at 996.

49. See id.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
See id. at 997 (contrasting the Campbell case with the Saarinencase).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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joined by Judge Simons and Judge Levine. 4 Judge Titone argued that
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(a)(2), which permits an emergency vehicle to pass a steady red signal after slowing down as may be necessary
for safe operation, 55 combined with § 1144(a), which requires other mo56
torists to yield the right of way to an approaching emergency vehicle,
jointly operated to give the fire truck a preemptive right of way, regardless of whether it faced a signal to stop.5 7 He pointed out that under the
court's decision in Saarinen, slight or momentary departures from traffic
safety rules are not the type of actions to which liability for recklessness
can be attached. 8 He concluded that, regardless of any momentary lapses
in judgment, 59 the truck driver may have exhibited, his use of warning
devices, coupled with his slow rate of speed,60 are not evidence61of reckless disregard on the driver's part, but "at most a pure accident."
In the present case, even if Officer Pilat was "negligent in glancing
down, this 'momentary judgment lapse' does not alone rise to the level
of recklessness required of the driver of an emergency vehicle in order
for liability to attach. 62
IV. CONCLUSION

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 gives operators of authorized emergency vehicles a qualified privilege to disregard the ordinary rules of
prudent and responsible driving. 63 The operator's conduct will be evaluated not against the usual negligence standard of due care, but rather

54. See id. at 998 (Titone, J., dissenting).
55. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1104 (a) (2).

56. Seeid. § 1144 (a).
57. See Campbell, 644 N.E.2d at 998 (Titone, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 999.

59. See id. at 1000.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Szczerbiak, 686 N.E.2d at 1349.

63. See id.
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against a standard of reckless disregard for the safety of others. 64 A momentary judgment lapse does not alone rise to the level of recklessness
required
of the driver of an emergency vehicle in order for liability to
65
attach.

64. See id.
65. See id.

